There is, moreover, a reasonable expectation, founded in
the nature of things, and possibly already supported by positive
promises and pledges, that England is to stand in the relation of
protector to the confederated States. Nor will she be in the least
disturbed by the institution of slavery, if perchance that institution
survives the struggle. If she can be secure in the monopoly of the best
cotton lands on the globe, if she can be manufacturer and shop-keeper
for the South, if she can deprive the North of one half of its
legitimate commerce, if she can obtain the control of the gulf of
Mexico, of the mouth of the Mississippi, if she can command the line of
sea-coast from Galveston to Fortress Monroe or even to Charleston, and
thus compel us to make our way to the Pacific by the passes of the Rocky
Mountains exclusively, there is no sacrifice of men, or of money, or of
principle, or of justice, that would be deemed too great by the English
people and government. But what then? Are we to make war upon England
because her sympathies and interests run thus with the South? Is it not
wiser to consider why it is that the South is sustained by the interests
and sympathies of England? If slavery for fifty years had been unknown
among us, could there be found a hundred men, within the limits of the
United States, who would accept a British protectorate under any
circumstances or for any purpose whatever? And is it not therein
manifest, that our foreign and domestic perils are alike due to slavery?
And shall we not have dealt successfully with all our foreign
difficulties when we shall have established the jurisdiction of the
United States over the territory claimed by the rebels? But until that
happy day arrives, we shall not be relieved for an instant from the
danger of a foreign war; and if the rebellion last six months longer,
there is no reason to suppose that a foreign war can be averted.
Pages:
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334