Then, Protagoras, which of the two assertions shall we renounce? One says
that everything has but one opposite; the other that wisdom is distinct
from temperance, and that both of them are parts of virtue; and that they
are not only distinct, but dissimilar, both in themselves and in their
functions, like the parts of a face. Which of these two assertions shall
we renounce? For both of them together are certainly not in harmony; they
do not accord or agree: for how can they be said to agree if everything is
assumed to have only one opposite and not more than one, and yet folly,
which is one, has clearly the two opposites--wisdom and temperance? Is not
that true, Protagoras? What else would you say?
He assented, but with great reluctance.
Then temperance and wisdom are the same, as before justice and holiness
appeared to us to be nearly the same. And now, Protagoras, I said, we must
finish the enquiry, and not faint. Do you think that an unjust man can be
temperate in his injustice?
I should be ashamed, Socrates, he said, to acknowledge this, which
nevertheless many may be found to assert.
And shall I argue with them or with you? I replied.
I would rather, he said, that you should argue with the many first, if you
will.
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