And of this he gave me the following proof. He said: You will
find, Socrates, that some of the most impious, and unrighteous, and
intemperate, and ignorant of men are among the most courageous; which
proves that courage is very different from the other parts of virtue. I
was surprised at his saying this at the time, and I am still more surprised
now that I have discussed the matter with you. So I asked him whether by
the brave he meant the confident. Yes, he replied, and the impetuous or
goers. (You may remember, Protagoras, that this was your answer.)
He assented.
Well then, I said, tell us against what are the courageous ready to go--
against the same dangers as the cowards?
No, he answered.
Then against something different?
Yes, he said.
Then do cowards go where there is safety, and the courageous where there is
danger?
Yes, Socrates, so men say.
Very true, I said. But I want to know against what do you say that the
courageous are ready to go--against dangers, believing them to be dangers,
or not against dangers?
No, said he; the former case has been proved by you in the previous
argument to be impossible.
That, again, I replied, is quite true. And if this has been rightly
proven, then no one goes to meet what he thinks to be dangers, since the
want of self-control, which makes men rush into dangers, has been shown to
be ignorance.
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