Kant, Immanuel / 2008-09-26 00:00:00
But in addition to the above considerations there is yet (to judge
by analogy) a further ground, upon which judgement may be brought into
line with another arrangement of our powers of representation, and one
that appears to be of even greater importance than that of its kinship
with the family of cognitive faculties. For all faculties of the soul,
or capacities, are reducible to three, which do not admit of any
further derivation from a common ground: the faculty of knowledge, the
feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and the faculty of desire.* For
the faculty of cognition understanding alone is legislative, if (as
must be the case where it is considered on its own account free of
confusion with the faculty of desire) this faculty, as that of
theoretical cognition, is referred to nature, in respect of which
alone (as phenomenon) it is possible for us to prescribe laws by means
of a priori concepts of nature, which are properly pure concepts of
understanding. For the faculty of desire, as a higher faculty
operating under the concept of freedom, only reason (in which alone
this concept has a place) prescribes laws a priori.
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